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Transfers from a higher-level government budget may affect the incentives of lower-lever govern-
ments to foster their tax base. If transfers offset completely changes in owned budgetary revenues,
fiscal incentives are destroyed. Using the data from a Russian region, we cannot reject the hypothesis
that transfers offset completely changes in municipal revenues, although the transfers are adjusted
with a lag. The estimates suggest that this transfers policy is due in part to short time horizons for
regional governments and commitment problems. Budgetary constraints of Russia’s regions could
have also played a role. Such initial conditions distinguish Russia from Poland and China.Journal
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1. Introduction
Several recent articles focus on the incentives of different levels of government in a
federal state undergoing transition from socialism to a market economy, e.g., Jin et al.
(1999), Litwack (2002), Qian and Roland (1998), Treisman (1996), and Zhuravskaya
(2000). While most of this literature concerns the relationship between the federal cen-
ter and the regions, the interaction between a region and its constituent municipalities is
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empirical analyses of incentives of local authorities in Russia. Using a unique set of data
on the budgets of 35 large Russian cities in 29 regions for the 1992 to 1997 period, she
investigates the degree of financial independence of cities from regional governments and
the resulting incentives for these cities to provide public goods. Importantly, Zhuravskaya
cannot reject the null hypothesis that, on average, the regional governments tend to offset
completely the changes in municipal revenues with changes in subsidies to municipalities.
This result implies that local governments lack fiscal incentives to develop their revenue
bases. However, Zhuravskaya presents no explanation for the apparently suboptimal be-
havior of regional governments that would support the hypothesis. Furthermore, her data
suffer from certain shortcomings.
Based in part on the findings of the market-preserving federalism literature and on
Zhuravskaya’s results, the apparent lack of fiscal independence of Russia’s municipalities
has become one of the commonly cited reasons for poor performance of the government
and the economy in Russia relative to Poland and China.1 Why do Russia’s regions fail
to provide a substantial degree of fiscal independence to their municipalities? Assuming
rationality of regional authorities, there are two possible answers. Either Zhuravskaya’s
results are incorrect or there is something about Russia’s circumstances that explains the
different, and ostensibly counterproductive, behavior of its regions.
In this paper, we pursue the following two goals. First, we use our own data set
from one of Russia’s regions to re-examine Zhuravskaya’s results concerning the financial
relationship between a region and its municipalities. While improving on Zhuravskaya’s
econometric procedure, we obtain results that modify but do not reject her basic findings.
Second, we suggest why Russia’s conditions early in the transition might have led its
regions to deprive their constituent municipalities of significant fiscal independence.
Our argument can be summarized in the following way. In the standard principal–agent
relationship with commitment in which the agent’s efforts influence the payoff, the princi-
pal always wants to provide the agent with incentives to exert effort. However, if the region
cannot commit to an efficient incentive scheme, a ratchet effect may arise and lead to a
highly suboptimal equilibrium. The regions’ commitment problems in Russia are likely to
be more severe than in Poland or China because of the high degree of political instability
and overall uncertainty in the country during the early stages of transition that resulted
in short-sighted horizons for regional governments. In addition, Russia’s regions possibly
perceived the efforts of municipal authorities as irrelevant to the revenue collections due to
a negligible size of the natural municipal tax base, i.e., the small private sector in Russia
at the start of the transition. However, our estimates do not lend much support to the latter
explanation.
The next section discusses the interaction between a region and its municipalities in a
principal–agent framework. Section 3 describes the technique used by Zhuravskaya (2000),
points out some of the problems with her approach, and presents our own estimates.
1 For a brief overview of market-preserving federalism theory, see Qian et al. (1997). The papers that at least
partly blame the dysfunctional incentives of local authorities for the poor performance of the Russian economy
include Jin et al. (1999), Freinkman et al. (1999), Shleifer (1997).
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regional governments in Russia.
2. Budgetary interaction between a region and its municipalities in Russia
2.1. A summary of Russia’s regional revenue sharing system
The sources of municipal budget revenues in Russia can be classified as own revenues
and revenues shared with municipalities through the discretion of regional governments.2
Own revenues belong to the municipality and cannot be appropriated easily by regional
governments. Own revenues include local taxes and fees, income from the use of municipal
property, and revenues from privatization of municipal property. In addition, own revenues
may include shares of federal and regional taxes assigned to the municipalities on a more or
less permanent basis by either federal or regional laws. For example, federal law requires
the regions to assign to each municipality at least 50% of the enterprise assets tax collected
on its territory and all of the personal income tax (PIT) from entrepreneurs who operate
without registering as juridical persons.
In the mid-1990s, regions were also supposed to assign some other tax revenues to their
municipalities on a permanent basis, although the federal law required the regions to assign
certain shares of some taxes only on average.3 Different municipalities may be assigned
different shares of these taxes and these assignments can change as long as the average re-
quirement is satisfied. Hence, for many municipalities, it is difficult to ascertain the degree
of the region’s discretion with respect to the assignment of the above taxes. First, one needs
to know the regional legislation on tax assignments and how difficult it is for the regional
government to change it. Second, even if the regional government is sufficiently powerful
to change tax assignment laws, it may have limited discretion about changing tax assign-
ments of large municipalities. For example, a federal law requires the regions to assign on
average at least 50% of the PIT to their municipalities. If the regional capital collects more
than 50% of the regional PIT, the region cannot reduce its PIT share to zero. All other
municipal budget revenues, including their shares of federal taxes that are retained by the
regions, regional taxes, as well as targeted and general subsidies paid to municipalities by
the regions, belong to the category of discretionary revenues (reguliruiushchie dokhody).
As was mentioned above, the federal law provides only for the minimum limits on as-
signments of certain tax revenues to municipalities. Many regions have either adopted leg-
islation or established procedures that go far beyond these requirements in terms of making
municipal revenues less dependent on the discretionary transfers from the regional gov-
2 Russia’s municipalities are divided into two categories. Tier 1 includes districts (raiony) and cities under
regional jurisdictions. Tier 2 consists of cities under district jurisdiction, villages, and townships. As of late 1996,
there were about 2500 Tier 1 municipalities. This paper focuses on the relationship between regions and their
Tier 1 municipalities.
3 Article 7 of the Federal Law “On the Financial Foundations of Local Self-Government in the Russian
Federation,” FZ #126, Sobranie zakonodatel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Collection of the Laws of the Russian
Federation), no. 39, pp. 7656–7666, September 1997.
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relations in five large oblast, namely, Nizhny Novgorod, Novgorod, Novosibirsk, Perm,
and Rostov, over a period of several years in the mid-1990s. Our analysis suggests that,
for a great majority of municipalities in these regions, many of the tax assignments that
have been traditionally viewed as discretionary have, in fact, been assigned to municipal
budgets on a stable basis. This statement holds for virtually all municipalities that receive
transfers from the regions in addition to the assigned to them tax revenues collected on their
territories (hereafter, poor municipalities), as well as for some of the richer municipalities.
Even though poor municipalities receive almost the entire regional shares of tax
revenues collected on their territory, they cannot generally cover their expenditure
responsibilities. For this reason, they receive significant financial assistance from the
regional budget in the form of targeted and non-targeted subsidies. For example, in Rostov
oblast, the share of explicit subsidies in total expenditures of the Tier 1 municipalities was
over 29% in 1997. For many poor municipalities, subsidies account for well over half of
their expenditures. In other words, the degree of financial independence of municipalities
depends mostly on the procedures for allocating these transfers.
To summarize, the degree of the region’s discretion with respect to a significant
portion of municipal revenues is difficult to determine. However, for the relatively poor
municipalities, almost all of regional tax revenue collected on their territory can be viewed
as assigned revenue, at least on the margin, i.e., as long as they remain in the category of
poor municipalities. In this sense, the determination of fiscal relationships between poor
municipalities and regional centers is relatively straightforward.
2.2. The region’s behavior and municipality’s incentives
All taxes in Russia are collected by the federal Ministry. Nonetheless, municipal
authorities may be able to influence the size of their revenue base, particularly with respect
to small business. Their incentives to foster their own tax base depend on the willingness of
the region to offset the changes in municipal own revenues with changes in transfers. If the
region routinely increases (reduces) transfers to the municipality one-for-one in response to
the decrease (increase) in municipal own revenues, the municipal authorities would have no
incentives to enhance their own tax base. In order to estimate the strength of the municipal
incentives to develop its own revenue base, Zhuravskaya (2000) regresses the change in
transfers from regional budget to municipalities between two years on the change in own
revenues of these municipalities for the same two years, controlling for population size,
city effects, and the year. The equation, with all control variables omitted is:
(1)(TA,t+1 − TA,t )= k · (RA,t+1 −RA,t )+ ε,
where RA,t and TA,t denote the actual own revenues and transfers from the region to the
municipality in year t , and ε is a random error. If the null hypothesis that k equals minus
one holds, the municipalities would have no incentive to grow their own tax bases.
Based on data from 1992 to 1997 for 35 large cities from various regions, Zhuravskaya
(2000) cannot reject the above null hypothesis. In fact, her point estimates for k are re-
markably close to minus one. This result is rather surprising if we consider the relationship
between the region and its municipality in a standard principal–agent framework, in which
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ally uncertain outcome of the agent’s activities and can commit to a certain reward scheme.
In our context, the region cannot observe directly the municipality’s actions with respect
to enhancing its revenue base, but can observe actual revenue collections and commit to
the amounts of transfers. It is rather straightforward to demonstrate that, if the principal is
able to commit and as long as greater effort by the agent increases the likelihood of better
outcome, the optimal contract would not completely deprive the agent of the incentive to
increase effort (Shavell, 1979, Proposition 2).
Of course, the relationship between a region and its municipality is more complicated
than this standard principal–agent framework. Among other things, the regional authorities
may care not only about their own share of taxes collected in the municipality, but also
about the size of municipal expenditures and, therefore, municipal revenues.4 Furthermore,
the regions interact with a number of different municipalities. Therefore, regional
authorities may have a goal to equalize municipal expenditures and face constraints with
respect to the amount of transfers they can make to compensate municipalities for revenue
shortfalls. However, these differences do not invalidate the general conclusion that regions
would find it in their interest to provide some incentive for municipalities to increase
the tax base.5 Moreover, the one-on-one offsetting of changes in municipal revenues
with transfers would make it more attractive for the municipalities to hide revenues from
regional authorities by, for example, asking the local taxpayers to contribute services to the
municipality in exchange for protection from the tax inspectors.6
In light of the above discussion, if Zhuravskaya’s results are correct, they could occur
either because municipal revenues are not significantly influenced by the municipal author-
ities’ effort or because the regions are not able to commit to an efficient course of action
or reward based on the observed amount of municipal revenue. In the next section, we re-
examine Zhuravskaya’s results using a data set from a Russian region. Later, we will use
our estimates to try to determine whether the irrelevance of municipal efforts or the regions’
commitment problem is more likely to affect the behavior of regional authorities. In addi-
tion, we compare the Russian circumstances with those in Poland and China in order to ex-
plain the apparent differences in the behavior of the regional authorities in these countries.
4 The optimal taxation literature might provide an appropriate framework for the analysis of region–
municipality interaction. This is only partly correct because, in optimal taxation models, there are no participation
constraints. In addition, the state typically is assumed to maximize the aggregate welfare of the taxpayers, while
in our case the region is concerned only with the amount of municipal expenditures. The municipal authorities’
overall welfare is not important as long as its utility does not drop below a certain level, i.e., the participation
constraint is satisfied.
5 Technically, the region’s interest in the municipal expenditures appears to produce the same outcome as the
increase in the degree of agent’s risk-aversion. As long as the region does not place greater weight on the size of
municipal expenditures than on its own share of tax revenues, the standard conclusion holds. It would also hold
if the region’s equalization goals did not override efficiency considerations completely.
6 Treisman (2000) examines how regional governments protect enterprises against federal authorities.
Presumably, municipalities would find it more difficult, but not impossible, to protect their taxpayers against
the regional center.
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The main purpose of this section is to estimate the relationship between municipal rev-
enues and transfers from the regional budget, using municipal-level budget data for Rus-
sia’s Rostov region (oblast) from 1996 to 1998. First, we run regressions based on Eq. (1)
and then propose a different estimating procedure to alleviate the shortcomings of the ear-
lier work.
Our budget data for Rostov oblast cover its 55 Tier 1 municipalities. Of these, 46 munic-
ipalities, all of which received direct subsidies from the region, retained the entire regional
shares of all major taxes except excises (i.e., VAT, profit tax, PIT, and enterprise assets tax),
throughout the period. This suggests that these 46 municipalities could be reasonably sure
that, on the margin, the changes in collections of these taxes would not lead to changes
in the sharing rates. For these municipalities, only the direct subsidies from the regional
budget were used to offset changes in revenue collections. Therefore, the task of separat-
ing own revenues from transfers becomes relatively easy. In the regressions based on these
46 municipalities, we treat all tax and non-tax revenues as own revenues, and transfers
will consist only of direct subsidies from the regional budget. The only issue is whether
the deficits incurred by the municipal budgets should be counted as part of the transfers.
We assume that municipal deficits most likely represent a short-term mismatch between
expenditures and revenues, and, therefore, we do not include deficits in the transfers.
Table 1 presents regressions similar to those found in Zhuravskaya (2000). The first
part of the table shows the estimates based on per capita values of the revenue and transfer
variables, while the second part of the table uses total amounts.7 Specifically, Table 1
Table 1
Results of regressions based on Eqs. (2) and (3)
Dependent variables
Independent (TA,t+1 − TA,t )/Popt TA,t+1 − TA,t
variables OLS Fixed effects Random effects OLS Fixed effects Random effects
Constant −8.24 7867 374798




(0.15) (0.24) (0.15) n/a n/a n/a
RA,t+1 −RA,t −0.34** 0.32** −0.23**
n/a n/a n/a (0.14) (0.27) (0.19)
Popt −1.22 −173 −1.29 −221 −38162 7286
(0.39) (101) (0.30) (43) (11685) (5043)
Year −263 −289 −269 1656 −2353 851
(43) (47) (38) (3190) (3518) (3344)
Adjusted R2 0.35 0.37 0.43 0.40
Notes. The Hausman test favors fixed effects models over random effects models. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
** The coefficient is greater than −1 at a 1% significance level.
7 We prefer the per capita regressions because otherwise the changes in subsidies and own revenues of larger
municipalities may have a very strong effect on the estimates of the regression coefficients.
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(2)TA,t+1 − TA,t
Popt
= a + k · (RA,t+1 −RA,t )
Popt
+ b2 · Popt + b3 · Y96+ ε and
(3)TA,t+1 − TA,t = a + k · (RA,t+1 −RA,t )+ b2 · Popt + b3 · Y96+ ε,
where Popt denotes municipal population in year t , and Y96 is a dummy variable for 1996.
We ran the regressions using OLS, fixed effects, and random effects techniques. The data
for transfers in year t + 1 were adjusted by the price index for Rostov oblast. However,
different ways of adjusting the data for different years are possible. For example, the data
could be adjusted by the ratio of the Rostov oblast sum of municipal total revenues for the
relevant years. In this case, the 1997 (1998) data would be multiplied by the ratio of the sum
of municipal revenues in 1996 to that of 1997 (1998). Such adjustment may be even more
reasonable than simply using the price index because regional budgets, and possibilities for
transfers in particular, are affected by several factors in addition to the change in the general
price level. Nonetheless, we decided to use the price index adjustment as our benchmark
case because it is more conventional and comparable to the estimates performed by others.
The results of regressions with the data adjusted by the total municipal revenues were
qualitatively similar to our benchmark results.
Unlike in Zhuravskaya’s work, none of the regression specifications yield estimates
of coefficients k close to minus one. In fact, most of these coefficients are only slightly
statistically different from zero and none of them are statistically different from −0.16,
the value that Jin et al. (1999) report for the province level from 1982 to 1992 in China.
However, this does not necessarily imply that Zhuravskaya’s conclusions were wrong.
First, our estimates are not directly comparable to hers, mainly because her data relate
to large cities in many different regions from 1992 to 1997, while our data are from
smaller municipalities located in the same region and cover the 1996 to 1998 period.
The time period may be important because of the adoption of the major federal law on
municipal finances in 1997.8 Furthermore, the regions’ fiscal policies with respect to their
capitals were probably different from their policies towards smaller municipalities, and
Rostov oblast may not be representative of other Russia’s regions. On the other hand, the
advantage of our estimates is that they reflect a certain policy rather than an average of
disparate policies across many different regions. In addition, our data allow for a more
reliable separation of own revenues from transfers.
More importantly, Eqs. (2) and (3) may not be entirely adequate for evaluating the fiscal
incentives of municipalities. There are at least two potential problems with Zhuravskaya’s
estimating procedure. First, her procedure may reject the hypothesis that k equals minus
one despite the absence of significant municipal fiscal independence. This can occur easily
if the adjustment of regional transfers to the municipality takes place at least in part with a
lag through the adjustment of future targets according to the ratchet principle familiarized
in the work of Weitzman (1980), Litwack (1993), and Roland and Sekkat (2000). For
example, suppose that actual revenues of a municipality remain stable through the year t
8 The law “On the Financial Foundations of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation” was enacted
in September 1997.
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one-on-one but with a one-year lag, the actual transfers would remain stable until the year
t + 2, and estimates of coefficient k based on the data through the year t + 1 would be
zero. Meanwhile, the lagged one-on-one adjustments of transfers limit fiscal independence
of municipalities significantly.
Conversely, the fact that estimating Eqs. (2) or (3) yields k equal to minus one need
not imply a lack of fiscal independence. For example, if the municipality’s own revenues
increase because the region has raised the rate of some tax that accrues to the municipality,
it would be natural for the region to reduce transfers by the appropriate amount. More
importantly, some significant sources of municipal revenue, such as the enterprise assets
tax, may have little to do with the efforts of municipal authorities. For example, if a region
uses profit tax exemptions to attract a large investment project to a given municipality, it
would increase the municipal tax base. In this case, a corresponding reduction in regional
transfers to the municipality would not undermine its financial independence. Both of the
above examples would yield estimates of the coefficient k equal to minus one even though
the municipalities may have a significant degree of fiscal independence.
We propose a different estimation procedure based on the comparison of actual
and planned revenues of municipalities that alleviates significantly, if not completely
eliminates, the above problems. Let subscript P denote the amounts of either own revenues
or transfers that the region plans for the municipality. Fiscal incentives of municipalities
can be evaluated from the following two types of regressions with the control variables
omitted:
(4)TA,t − TP,t = k · (RA,t −RP,t )+ ε,
(5)TP,t+1 − TP,t = k · (RA,t −RP,t )+ ε.
Assuming that k = 0, Eq. (4) implies that the region adjusts its transfers during the same
year in which actual own revenues deviate from the target. Relationship (5) reflects a one-
year lag. Note that regressions based on (4) and (5) are not affected systematically by any
changes in municipal revenues and regional transfers exogenous to the municipality as long
as these changes are taken into account in devising the plans for own revenues and transfers.
With different notation and without a constant term, Eq. (5) is identical to the expression
of the ratchet principle in Weitzman (1980).As Weitzman (1980) demonstrates, the agent’s
incentives to raise output under a ratchet principle are inversely proportional to (1− k/r),
where r is the discount rate. Even if k = −1, the agent still has some, albeit weak,
incentives to exert effort, particularly if r is relatively high, as it has been in Russia in
the initial period after 1992 reforms.
Ratcheting future targets, as in Eq. (5), may result from the inability of the principal
to commit to an efficient reward scheme in the presence of unobservable effort by
heterogeneous agents. In Eq. (4), k < 0 may be a consequence of an extreme type of
commitment problem, in which the principal is unable to commit even to the present
period reward. However, it may also represent rational behavior by the region if the region
assumes that municipal efforts have no effect on municipal revenues. Unlike in Poland,
such a perception may be quite reasonable in Russia, where the legal small business sector
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Eqs. (4) and (5) helps us to determine the nature of the region’s commitment problems and
its perception of the importance of municipal efforts. Note that Zhuravskaya’s procedure
is more closely related to Eq. (4) than to (5).10
As required by the proposed estimation procedure, our data for Rostov oblast contain
both the planned targets and actual revenues and transfers for its 55 Tier 1 municipalities
for the 1996 to 1998 period.11 These data allow us to estimate the following four types of
regressions based on (4) and (5):
(6)TA,t − TP,t
Popt
= a + k · (RA,t −RP,t )
Popt
+ b2 · Popt + b3 · Y96+ b4 · Y97 + ε,
(7)TP,t+1 − TP,t
Popt
= a + k · (RA,t −RP,t )
Popt
+ b2 · Popt + b3 · Y96+ ε,
(8)TA,t − TP,t = a + k · (RA,t −RP,t )+ b2 · Popt + b3 · Y96+ b4 · Y97 + e,
(9)TP,t+1 − TP,t = a + k · (RA,t −RP,t )+ b2 · Popt + b3 · Y96+ e,
where Popt denotes municipal population in the year t , and Y96 and Y97 denote the
respective year dummies. We ran the regressions using OLS, fixed effects, and random
effects techniques. As before, we adjust the data for the year t + 1 by the Rostov oblast
price index.
Table 2 shows the estimates of the coefficients for (6) and (7) based on per capita data,
while Table 3 presents the similar estimates for Eqs. (8) and (9).
Our data do not allow for the random effects specification of the per capita models
because the estimates of the variance of the error term are negative. This is not
an uncommon problem and generally it is not considered to be an indication of a
misspecification of the model (Greene, 2000; Baltagi, 1995). In order to eliminate this
problem, we ran the random effects regressions for the per capita data either without the
year dummies, as in Tables 2 and 3, or without the constant as in Table 1. The excluded
variables are not statistically significant in the corresponding fixed effects specifications.
9 In the fall of 1991, only about 2.5% of Russia’s industrial output was produced at non-state-owned
enterprises (Ivanov and Kolbasova, 1992). Employment in Russia’s cooperatives, that were essentially small
private enterprises, comprised about 3% of all non-agricultural sector employment in 1991 (Rossiia-1993, 1993).
Even during the first year of reforms in 1992, legal small businesses employed slightly more than 10% of non-
agricultural labor force. Moreover, a quarter of this employment was concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg
(OECD, 1997). Outside of these two cities, the legal small business sector was truly miniscule. In Poland, the
private sector, comprised presumably mostly of small enterprises, accounted for 29% of industrial employment
and 16% of industrial output in 1989 (Ernst et al., 1996, Table 4.2). For the entire economy, the respective
percentages were 47% and 30%.
10 If the planned targets in (4) are the same for t and t + 1 periods, the true value of the coefficient k in (1)
would be the same as in (4). Under these assumptions, Eq. (1) could be obtained from (4) by subtracting the
relationships for the year t from those for the year t + 1.
11 We are aware that budget plans of municipalities may change considerably in the course of a year (see, for
example, Kurlyandskaya et al. (2002), as well as information obtained by Kurlyandskaya from personal interviews
of municipal officials in Leningrad oblast). However, our data on planned revenues and transfers are from the
original annual budget plans.
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Regression results for Eqs. (6) and (7)
Dependent variables
Actual minus planned transfers Change in planned transfers
Independent (TA,t − TP,t )/Popt (TP,t+1 − TP,t )/Popt
variables OLS Fixed effects Random effects OLS Fixed effects Random effects
Constant −169 n/a −140.7 −83.8 n/a −83.8
(35) (26.8) (20.6) (18.6)
(RA,t −RP,t )/Popt 0.22** −0.39** 0.19** −0.84 −0.43** −0.84
(0.23) (0.24) (0.19) (0.15) (0.19) (0.14)
Popt 2.09 167 2.07 1.29 235 1.29
(0.36) (43) (0.39) (0.26) (49) (0.24)
Year 96 51.9 11.9 −232 175 −232
(42.0) (38.7) – (22) (23) (20.3)
Year 97 28.4 −2.65
(39.1) (35.3) – n/a n/a n/a
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.37 – 0.59 0.67 –
Notes. The Hausman test favors fixed effects for the first model and random effects for the second. Standard errors
are in parentheses.
** The coefficient is greater than (−1) at 1% significance level.
Table 3
Regression results for Eqs. (8) and (9)
Dependent variables
Independent Actual minus planned transfers, TA,t − TP,t Change in planned transfers, TP,t+1 − TP,t
variables OLS Fixed effects Random effects OLS Fixed effects Random effects
Constant −15754 n/a −887215 −6489 n/a −6533
(3667) (282933) (1992) (1799)
RA,t −RP,t −0.13** −0.59 −0.28** −0.94 −0.56** −0.94
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23) (0.10) (0.12) (0.08)
Popt 271 33009 17111 158 28129 159
(39) (5008) (3493) (28) (5177) (26)
Year 96 11236 4449 113 4146 138
(4272) (4082) – (2083) (1902) (1756)
Year 97 564 −4299
(4236) (3983) – n/a n/a n/a
Adjusted R2 0.28 0.39 – 0.50 0.65 –
Notes. The Hausman test favors fixed effects models over random effects models. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
** The coefficient is greater than (−1) at 1% significance level.
We derive the following conclusions from the results presented in Tables 2 and 3.
For all but one specification of the model for the same year transfers, we can reject
strongly the hypothesis that the changes in transfers completely offset fluctuations in
municipal revenues. Even in the fixed effects specification of the same year transfer
adjustment model, the point estimate is considerably greater than minus one. Moreover,
none of the specifications of this model based on per capita data, which we think is more
appropriate, yields k statistically different from 0. However, in the OLS and random effects
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planned and actual municipal revenues are close to minus one. Therefore, to the extent
that the changes in subsidies from the region offset changes in municipal revenues, this
offsetting appears to take place partly—or even mostly—through the adjustment of next
year targets for subsidies rather than in the year when revenues are collected.
In light of our earlier discussion of Eqs. (4) and (5), these results suggest that the Rostov
regional government probably did not perceive the efforts of municipal authorities as
completely irrelevant to municipal revenues. Furthermore, the government’s commitment
problem related mostly to future targets rather than to current ones.
Finally, we ran regressions based on Eqs. (6) through (9) for all municipalities of the
Rostov oblast, including the relatively rich ones. The results of these regressions differ
significantly from the ones reported above. All coefficients k in the per capita regressions
based on (6) and (7) are positive, sometimes strongly so, for all three types of specifications.
Regressions based on (8) and (9) yield coefficients on changes in municipal revenues that
are not significantly different from minus one for all three types of specifications. However,
we tend to discount these results, because we think that regional policy with respect to
the largest municipalities is probably quite different from regional policy toward smaller
ones. Furthermore, we used different approaches to distinguish between transfers and own
revenues for the poor municipalities and for all municipalities. However, it is instructive
to see how the addition of a few qualitatively different municipalities to the sample can
change the regression outcomes. Presumably this fact speaks in favor of our basic approach
of using relatively homogeneous municipalities instead of those from different regions.
4. Concluding observations
In the context of fiscal interaction between the regional center and the municipal
government in a principal–agent framework, we argue that, if the region can commit to
a reward scheme and if the efforts of municipal authorities affect local revenue collections,
the center would not want to offset completely the changes in owned municipal revenues
with the opposite changes in transfers to the municipality. Following Zhuravskaya (2000),
we conduct statistical tests of the strength of municipal fiscal incentives using municipal
budget data for the Rostov oblast. Our data allow for a more precise formulation of these
tests. Similar to Zhuravskaya, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the regional center
offset changes in municipal revenues with changes in its subsidies. However, we show
that this offsetting is likely to take place through the adjustment of next year transfers,
rather than through the current year transfers. Our results are not directly comparable to
those of Zhuravskaya because our data cover only poorer municipalities concentrated in
one region but they suggest that at least this region provided some incentives to the poor
municipalities because of the lag in the adjustment of transfers.
The issue of the differences between the center’s approach to richer and poorer
municipalities is a potentially fruitful direction of future research. We tried to establish
these differences by including dummy variables for the rich municipalities in interaction
with the changes in own revenues in our regressions. The coefficients of the terms with
dummy variables are not significantly different from zero. This is probably because our
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available, we may be able to increase the power of these tests.
Given our qualified support of Zhuravskaya’s results, we need to answer the issue
of why the behavior of regional governments in Russia is apparently different from
the behavior of their counterparts in Poland and China.12 We mentioned one difference
between Russia and Poland as the size of the legal small business sector in the initial
stage of transition. However, our empirical estimates do not suggest that this difference is
crucial with respect to the region’s behavior. Also, the small business sector in China was
initially probably even smaller than that in Russia. Therefore, the main difference between
the regions’ behavior in Russia on the one hand, and in Poland and China on the other, has
to do most likely with the nature of commitment problems.
The government’s commitment problem has been more severe in Russia than in Poland
presumably due to the relative weakness of the rule of law in Russia. The comparison
with China, where the purely legal restraints on government have been at least as weak
as in Russia, is less straightforward. However, the strength of the rule of law in this
context matters significantly only if the regions have a short planning horizons. When the
principal–agent relationship is perceived to be long-term, there is a much greater possibility
of achieving a good equilibrium in which the agent exerts high effort and the principal
commits credibly to not raising the agent’s future targets.
The length of the planning horizon of the government authorities is determined mainly
by the degree of institutional stability of the country’s political system and the overall
degree of uncertainty in the country. In both respects, China appears to have had a
significant advantage over Russia in the early stages of transition, implying that the Chinese
authorities at all levels must have had longer planning horizons than the corresponding
authorities in Russia. This, in turn, would make upper-level governments in China more
interested in providing a significant measure of fiscal independence to the lower-level
authorities. Moreover, the longer-term perspective would also improve the incentives
of entrepreneurs to expand existing businesses and start new ones after controlling for
investment climate. In addition, from the beginning of transition, the Chinese regions and
municipalities might have expected significant rewards for business-friendly policies due
to the potential investment from Chinese living overseas.
Even if the overall possibility of regional governments to commit were not very
different in the three countries, the precarious fiscal situation in many Russian regions
could have affected negatively the outcomes engendered by the ratchet principle. In the
absence of commitment by the principal and under asymmetric information about the
agents’ productivity, two alternative equilibria are possible (Roland and Sekkat, 2000). In a
separating equilibrium, the more productive agents exert high effort and receive immediate
large rents that disappear in later periods as the targets are ratcheted upwards. However,
the payment of initial rents to the highly productive agents requires substantial up-front
expenditures on rents by the region. If the region is significantly fiscally constrained, the
12 The latter question has to be qualified by the fact that we are not aware of any careful empirical study of
fiscal incentives in the interaction of regional governments and municipal authorities in either Poland or China.
The arguments in Shleifer (1997) with respect to Poland and Jin et al. (1999) with respect to China are somewhat
informal or do not relate necessarily to the interaction at the same government levels.
32 M. Alexeev, G. Kurlyandskaya / Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (2003) 20–33outcome is a pooling equilibrium, in which the principal accepts low effort from the
more productive agents. Once obtained, the pooling equilibrium is likely to be stable.
The one-on-one offsetting of changes in municipal revenues by transfers weakens the
municipalities’ incentives to develop their own tax base and thereby justifies the equivalent
offsetting in the future. This logic of a vicious circle is consistent with the fact that small
business employment in Russia stagnated during the 1992 to 1999 period (OECD, 1997;
GOSKOMSTAT, 2000).
Blanchard and Shleifer (2001) provide a complementary explanation of the difference
between Russia and China. They argue that Russia’s regional governments might not have
been interested in economic growth because they had been captured by the old incumbent
firms. Meanwhile, Russia’s central government, which is more likely to be interested in
growth, did not have the power to punish the anti-growth policies of the regions. In contrast,
the central government in China is sufficiently strong to discipline the regions and the
incumbent firms are weaker, so that the probability of capturing regional governments is
reduced.
All of the above arguments underline the importance of initial conditions for the
fiscal relationship between the region and its municipalities, in particular, the large size
of the tax base that is responsive to the municipalities’ efforts and the political and
institutional stability of the country. Until these conditions are in place, fiscal independence
of municipalities and the resulting incentives for policies conducive to local economic
development are difficult to achieve.
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